The political logic of populist hype: the case of right wing populism’s ‘meteoric rise’ and its relation to the status quo by Mondon, Aurelien & Glynos, Jason
        
Citation for published version:
Mondon, A & Glynos, J 2016 'The political logic of populist hype: the case of right wing populism’s ‘meteoric rise’
and its relation to the status quo' POPULISMUS Working Papers, vol. 4, Populismus, Thessaloniki.
Publication date:
2016
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication
Publisher Rights
CC BY-NC-ND
University of Bath
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 13. May. 2019
 Jason Glynos & Aurelien Mondon
The political logic of populist hype: The case of 
right-wing populism’s ‘meteoric rise’ and its 
relation to the status quo
POPULISMUS Working Papers No. 4 
Thessaloniki 
December 2016 
Jason Glynos & Aurelien Mondon 
The political logic of populist hype: The case of right-wing 
populism’s ‘meteoric rise’ and its relation to the status 
quo∗  
 
Introduction  
‘The European elections have delivered their truth, and it is painful’. François 
Hollande’s assessment of the 2014 European election results was damning, pointing 
to widespread ‘distrust of Europe and of government parties’ (Higgins 26 May 2014). 
This evaluation of the result was shared by journalists and politicians commenting on 
the ‘shock’, ‘earthquake’, or ‘tsunami’ that shook the continent and its leaders to 
their core. Later that year, the political commentator Tony Barber (Barber 16 
September 2014) issued a stark warning: ‘European democracy must keep right-wing 
populism at bay’. The article appeared in the Financial Times as wave after wave of 
populist electoral advances following the European elections appeared to test the 
foundations of European liberal democracy at the regional, national, and local levels. 
While acknowledging that ‘right-wing populism displays different characteristics from 
country to country, possessing a nastier far-right streak in Greece and Hungary than 
in Germany and the UK’, right-wing populist parties were nonetheless lumped 
together by Barber to represent a unified albeit murky threat to democracy itself. In 
this view, democracy epitomizes the ideal of moderation and rational deliberation, 
while populism carries with it the spectre of extremism and passions gone awry. 
Tellingly, Barber’s explanation of the populist phenomenon to which he is witness is 
virtually non-existent. How European democracy is to keep right-wing populism at 
bay is thus left unanswered. Instead, his characterization of the current situation as 
an impasse sounds fateful and alarmist, conjuring, as he does, a rather curious image 
of the apparently robust walls of Jericho pitted against the passionate and powerful 
horn-blowing of the Israelites. 
We argue that this Financial Times opinion piece is typical of the sort of 
response in the wake of the populist phenomenon in France and the United 
Kingdom, as well as other European countries. When reproduced endlessly across 
mainstream media outlets and even some academic fora, it becomes an instance of 
what is referred to in this article as ‘populist hype’. The term ‘populist hype’ seeks to 
capture at least three things. First, it aims to capture something about how 
politicians, as well as media and academic commentators, have tended to skew the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
∗ This working paper was conceived in the wake of the 2014 Populismus conference in Thessaloniki 
and first presented at the Political Studies Association Conference in 2015. It has since received 
considerable feedback from journal reviewers and colleagues, which we have incorporated into this 
version of our paper. The ideas, as originally conceived, have proved rather prescient given recent 
developments in the UK (Brexit), the US (Trump’s election), France (the presidential elections), and 
elsewhere; and it is for this reason that its publication in its present form in the Populismus 
Observatory remains timely. Our thesis will be further elaborated and updated in relation to 
developments from 2016 onwards in due course; in the meantime, we would like to thank the 
Populismus team for their help and feedback, particularly Yannis Stavrakakis, as well as the many 
reviewers and colleagues for their useful comments. 
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meaning of the populist phenomenon. In our case, this involves presenting an overly 
simplistic and homogenized picture of the ‘meteoric’ rise of right-wing populism 
across Europe. This is accomplished by individual analyses and commentaries that 
make assertions on the basis of highly selective use, and decontextualized 
interpretations, of electoral results. Second, populist hype entails the exaggeration of 
the significance of the populist phenomenon, particularly as regards its political 
significance. This is accomplished primarily by the sheer volume of copy devoted to 
the discussion of the apparent rise of right-wing populism, as opposed to other 
manifestations of discontent.  The ‘hyped’ response to the 2014 electoral outcomes 
exaggerated the political significance of the populist phenomenon by suggesting, for 
example, that right-wing populist parties and movements are the only (or main) 
political alternative to the mainstream status quo. While the Front National (FN) and 
UKIP have had a clear impact on the political agenda as their programme and 
discourse entered the mainstream, we argue that this impact was not simply a 
reflection of their electoral or strategic achievements, but also a product of the 
exaggerated role attributed to the FN and UKIP by mainstream politicians and 
commentators. Finally, with the term ‘populist hype’ this article highlights how many 
political commentators tend to characterize the populist phenomenon in apocalyptic 
terms. There is a tendency in the present case, for example, to emphasize how the 
rise of right-wing populism signals nothing less than a threat to democracy as such. In 
looking across the three dimensions of the hyped response to the populist 
phenomenon, however, it is worth pointing out how they should not be understood 
as entirely autonomous from one another: they are in fact often found to be in a 
relation of over-determination with each other (Althusser 2005[1962]). 
In drawing attention to this generalized ‘populist hype’ we are not suggesting 
that the varying degrees of success of right-wing parties, in our case UKIP and the 
FN, do not deserve attention or that they do not have a real impact on politics and 
exclusion. Our focus is related, but distinct. We draw attention instead to the 
skewed interpretation of many commentators, which often identifies right-wing 
populism as itself a disease rather than as a mere symptom. The aim of this article is 
thus not to engage with right-wing populist parties themselves, but rather with a 
particular interpretation of, and reaction to, their recent electoral performances by 
the ‘mainstream’, and how it has helped distort the diagnosis on the current state of 
liberal democracy in the post-democratic world (Crouch 2004). Yet the article does 
not simply engage in a re-characterization exercise that substitutes one picture of 
the 2014 right-wing populist ‘wave’ in France and the UK with another more 
accurate one. This re-characterization is of course essential, but we seek first and 
foremost to re-problematize the hyped response to the populist phenomenon. In 
particular, we argue that the problem with populist hype is not merely that it 
misrepresents what is actually going on. The main issue is in fact that populist hype 
has a ‘logic’ whose integrity and efficacy does not rely in any straightforward way on 
its representational truth or untruth.  
Drawing on the Essex School of discourse theory, and closely associated 
strands of psychoanalytic political theory (Glynos and Howarth 2007, Laclau and 
Mouffe 1985, Stavrakakis et al. 2000, Glynos 2001, Stavrakakis 1999, Zizek 1993), as 
well as recent analyses of populist parties across Europe (see for example, Mral et al. 
2013, Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012, Wodak 2015) and their relationship to the media 
(Mudde 2007, Mazzoleni 2008), we argue that populist hype has functioned as a 
political logic. By qualifying it as a political logic the aim is to foreground how the 
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dominant ‘hyped’ response to the populist conjuncture by politicians and the media 
has served to pre-empt the contestation of some troubling norms animating the 
regimes of ‘really existing’ liberal democracy and to contest other norms which many 
consider worthy of defence. For example, instead of serving as an occasion to 
broach a set of debates about the character of liberal democracy as it operates today 
in Europe, the horrific spectre of a populism gone amok is more often used to 
conjure the image of an imminent threat to democracy as such. This logic tends to 
marginalise meaningful debate about the way democracy tends to operate, i.e., as an 
electoral democracy that installs and reinforces alienating tendencies (Katsambekis 
2015). Moreover, this article argues that the tenacity of populist hype – and its 
continued role as a political logic – indicates how it has successfully tapped into 
potent affective registers rooted in collective desires and fantasies structured around 
the idea of ‘theft of enjoyment’, giving it its energy and verve. 
A key aim of the article is to show how the above-mentioned theoretical 
resources can be deployed to frame the 2014 populist conjuncture (and similar 
conjunctures) in a productive way. More systematic empirical research can provide 
sharper accounts of populist hype in precise settings, but given the limited scope of 
this article, and to provide a starting point, our aim rather is to make a theoretical 
intervention that generates some insight, points to new ‘interpretive’ hypotheses, 
and reframes problems. Examples to illustrate and help better formulate our 
hypotheses will be drawn from France and the United Kingdom. These countries 
were selected because of the electoral gains made by UK and French right-wing 
populist parties in the 2014 European elections and because of the voluminous 
commentary these parties have attracted more generally, a commentary that has 
itself been folded into a narrative about wider European populist trends, despite 
distinct historical origins of country-specific populist parties (Crépon et al. 2015, 
Startin 2015). More generally, however, this theoretical intervention offers a 
framework within which one could subsequently and more systematically explore 
and probe hypotheses about the character and significance of ‘populist hype’. 
Rather than applying to the case studies our own theoretical understanding of 
populism,  this article explores the implications of the way the term ‘populism’ is 
mobilised by key ‘enunciators’ (i.e., politicians, political commentators, etc.) in the 
2014 populist conjuncture. To this end, the argument of this article proceeds in 
three steps. First, it problematises right-wing populist hype as a dominant response 
to the conjuncture of 2014, particularly as regards the EU elections. It then 
considers how a critique that relies only on pointing to the falsehood presupposed 
by such hype misses its political and ideological significance. We draw out its political 
significance by identifying two key norms at stake in ‘really existing’ liberal 
democracy: electoral primacy and presumptive equality. This entails articulating the 
political logic embodied in the ‘performance’ of populist hype. Finally, it hypothesizes 
that its ideological significance is linked to the fantasmatic narratives that shape the 
affective tenor of the mainstream response to the populist conjuncture. 
 
Characterizing and problematizing right-wing populist hype 
It has already been noted that the expression ‘populist hype’ aims to capture at least 
three, potentially inter-related, dimensions associated with the storylines offered by 
politicians, journalists, and some academics: (i) a rather selective and thus skewed 
understanding of the populist phenomenon, namely, as a simple and sizeable rise of 
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right-wing party popularity across Europe that obfuscates a more complex set of 
developments; (ii) an exaggeration of the significance of this rise, particularly as 
regards the political role attributed to right-wing populist parties and movements (by 
implying they are the main alternative to the status quo); and (iii) a tendency to 
describe the rise of right-wing populism in apocalyptic tones that signal a threat to 
democracy as such. Each of these dimensions entails claims that can be rebutted 
through a contextualization process that yields a more nuanced picture. 
It is first important to restate that our aim here is not to deny that there has 
been a rise in popularity of some radical right parties or to downplay their impact 
across Europe. Instead, we focus on the reaction their rise has triggered and the 
ways in which it may have been skewed and exaggerated, leading to an ideological 
realignment and shift in political discourse favourable to right-wing objectives and 
dispositions (Kallis 2013, Mondon 2013). Clearly, some parties achieved remarkable 
results with the French Front National (FN), the Dansk Folkeparti (DF) and the UK 
Independence Party (UKIP) winning the ballot in their respective countries. With the 
return of the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) to the forefront of politics in 
Austria, there were signs that reconstructed extreme right parties made a European 
breakthrough in 2014. On the more extreme side of alleged ‘right-wing populism’, 
the relative success of Jobbik (J) in Hungary and Chrysí Avgí (Golden Dawn - GD) in 
Greece were also used to warn of the return of a ‘nastier’ politics. Yet, as Cas 
Mudde (Mudde 22 August 2013) noted before the election, caution was needed in 
interpreting such results as the simplistic rise of a unified ‘populist right’: ‘despite all 
the talk of the rise of the far right as a consequence of the Great Recession, the 
sober fact is that far right parties have gained support in “only” eleven of the twenty-
eight EU member states, and increased their support substantially in a mere five’. 
The elections confirmed this as parties such as Geert Wilders’ Partij voor de 
Vrijheid (PVV) and the Vlaams Belang (VB) suffered setbacks. The performance of 
‘populist’ parties was therefore uneven at best in the European elections (see figure 
1). 
 
Figure 1. Right-wing populist party results in the European elections  
(as a percentage of the total votes cast) – source: European Parliament 
However, the skewed character of a simplistic (and panicked) picture 
portraying a rather monolithic right-wing populist rise across Europe can be further 
put into question by focussing on the magnitude of this rise, not just on the above-
mentioned geographical unevenness. Even in those countries that show a rise in 
popular support for right wing parties, the magnitude attributed to this rise can vary 
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depending on the assumptions underlying the calculation of the magnitude. The 
above figures portray popular support as a proportion of the total votes cast.  But an 
alternative measure of popular support can be derived by looking at votes cast in 
relation to the number of registered voters. Viewed from this latter perspective, 
panicky pictures of a Europe-wide right-wing rise appear even more skewed (or 
‘hyped’) than a simple geographic corrective would suggest (see figure 2).1 As Figure 
2 shows, apart from the Dansk Folkeparti, all other parties failed to appeal to more 
than ten per cent of registered voters.  
 
Figure 2. Right-wing populist party results in the European elections  
(as a percentage of registered voters) – source: European Parliament 
Therefore, the simplistic picture of a rise of right-wing populism can appear 
skewed as a result of selective evidence-gathering practices linked to geography and 
vote share measurements. These spatial complications, however, can be 
supplemented with temporal-contextual complications linked to the comparative 
historical trajectories of individual parties. Such comparisons can introduce some 
further rather striking nuance to the above simplistic picture of a ‘rise’, particularly if 
we look at the two parties poised to lead the debate about a potential populist 
alliance in the aftermath of the elections. The FN saw a surge in vote compared to 
the 2004 and 2009 elections when it reached a trough towards the end of Jean-Marie 
Le Pen’s presidency. However, put in temporal perspective, this increase translated 
into a sharp fall compared to Marine Le Pen’s 2012 presidential bid (13.95 per cent 
of the registered vote against 9.3). While European elections attract traditionally 
fewer voters, this decrease of more than 1.7 million votes in elections favourable to 
protest parties, and with government ratings at a record low, demonstrated the 
relatively limited ability of the FN to bring voters (back) to the polling booths. 
Similarly, UKIP’s increase from 5.61 per cent to 9.11 per cent of the registered vote 
was far less impressive than the 27.5% commonly advertised. Despite ‘historically 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In making these points we do not mean to suggest that measuring party popularity as a function of 
registered voters is necessarily always better than as a function of vote share. However, the 
interesting point for us relates to the way in which democratic legitimacy and party support is 
measured, and how the present form of populist hype relies on the selective or predominant use of 
just one of these measures. One of the aims of the article is to demonstrate that these measures 
belong very much to a contested area, but that, currently, the most common measure referenced 
with regard to party support and electoral performance is vote share. While this measure is certainly 
useful, our aim is to highlight that such a measure is only one of a range of possible measures.  
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unprecedented levels of coverage for a minor party’,2 the party whose platform had 
always focused only on the European questions failed to appeal to more than one 
out of nine UK voters. 
So far we have sought to demonstrate in what sense the idea of ‘populist hype’ 
can be said to rely on a skewed portrait of the rise of right wing party popularity. 
Given a relatively modest popular support, it is interesting to note how much media 
coverage is devoted to the discussion of the rise of right-wing populist parties 
(Crépon et al. 2015, Goodwin and Ford 2013). This disproportionately voluminous 
media exposure tends to assign a rather exaggerated significance to the rise of such 
parties generally, and a rather exaggerated political significance more specifically. A 
casual database search reveals a disproportionate number of mentions of UKIP and 
the FN compared to left-wing alternatives, for example, and – occasionally – even 
governing parties. In the UK, in the month leading up to the 2014 European 
elections, the term ‘UKIP’ appeared in 1,116 headlines in the United Kingdom in the 
main national newspapers, while the term ‘Green Party’ appeared in less than 20 
headlines. Interestingly the term ‘abstention’ – which would indicate a more nuanced 
picture emerging – appeared in none.3 UKIP’s television coverage showed a similar 
picture, with ‘‘imagebites” of UKIP and Nigel Farage appear(ing) more than other 
parties and their leaders’ (Cushion et al. 2015). It is a short step from here to 
creating an impression that right-wing parties are widely understood as the 
alternative to mainstream parties, even if much of the reporting is negative and large 
slices of the public vehemently disagree or disapprove of the objectives and ideals of 
right-wing parties (see images 1a and 1b and Willsher et al. 16 November 2014 
amongst others).  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Between 2009 and 2013, Matthew Goodwin and Rob Ford (2013) counted ‘25 appearances by Nigel 
Farage on Question Time and more than 23,000 press mentions’.  
3 This includes the print and electronic versions of national newspapers including the Daily Mail, The 
Telegraph, The Guardian, The Independent, The Times, the Mirror, the Evening Standard, The Sun, and the 
Express. Analysis undertaken via the Lexis-Nexis database, from 22 April 2014 to 22 May 2014.  
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Images 1. 1a. Front page from Libération on 26 May 2014, the day after 
the FN ‘won’ the European elections, despite failing to appeal to more 
than 1 out of ten voters. 1b. Front page from The Guardian on 4 May 
2014, a year before the European elections. 
Cécile Alduy and Stéphane Wahnich (Alduy and Wahnich 2015) have 
highlighted a similarly disproportionate trend for the FN in the French media. In 
2007, Nicolas Sarkozy was mentioned 1029 times in the mainstream media, and Jean-
Marie Le Pen 518 times, even though the future president received more than three 
times the number of votes of the FN candidate in the presidential election that year. 
In 2010, even before becoming leader of her party, Marine Le Pen received more 
coverage than UMP president Jean-François Copé (581 occurrences to 481) and only 
marginally less than Francois Hollande (676), then secretary of the Parti Socialiste 
and future president. Since then, the trend has favoured FN coverage despite 
stringent media laws. A clear indication of this disproportionate media exposure of, 
and thus exaggerated significance attributed to, FN can be gleaned by looking at 
BFMTV. BFMTV, one of the most popular news channels in France, received a formal 
warning from the Supreme Audiovisual Council (CSA) for its coverage of the 2014 
local elections between the 10th of February and the 14th of March: 42.23% of the 
time allocated to the campaign concerned the FN, while the UMP received 18.67% 
and the PS 14.77% (CSA 19 March 2014). While BFMTV was forced by law to even 
out its coverage, Henri Maler and Julien Salingue (2014, 103) rightly noted that ‘the 
political reach of the results of the FN can be measured with their media reach. And, 
in this respect, there is no doubt that the media construct of the Front National is 
disproportionate’. 
Finally, we come to the third dimension of the ‘hyped’ response: the 
portrayal of the rise of right-wing populism in predominantly apocalyptic terms.4 This 
is an important dimension to foreground because it appears to sustain or ‘energize’ 
the other dimensions on account of their overdetermined inter-relation. Natural 
disaster metaphors such as ‘shock’, ‘wave’ and ‘earthquake’ commonly headline the 
front pages of major newspapers after so-called populist breakthroughs. We qualify 
these rhetorical flourishes as apocalyptic because they tend to convey a sense of 
existential threat: the issue is framed in terms of survival, be it for Europe or 
democracy itself (see for example MacShane 30 December 2014).  
In better understanding the character of this threat, at least as it is portrayed 
by many politicians and journalists, it is helpful to appeal to the concept of ‘theft of 
enjoyment’, which derives from the psychoanalytic tradition. ‘Theft of enjoyment’ 
expresses an idea about how, at a fundamental level, each subject’s enjoyment, 
associated with the pleasures and pains of one’s way of life, is always already a 
reflexive enjoyment: my own enjoyment is structured on the basis of how I imagine 
others enjoying themselves. This reflexivity triggers a whole array of different 
affective responses. For example, it may trigger jealousy if I imagine others enjoying 
themselves excessively. Or it may trigger feelings of outrage and resentment if I 
imagine others not merely enjoying themselves excessively, but enjoying themselves 
at my expense (cf. Chang and Glynos 2011). The idea of ‘theft of enjoyment’ tries to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 While this is outside the remit of this article, a similar argument could be made with regard to left-
wing populism and its coverage. 
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capture what is at stake in this latter case, or similar sorts of cases, because we may 
experience our own enjoyment as ‘stolen’. 
As Slavoj Žižek (Žižek 1993) notes regarding the concept of the nation,  
 It appears to us as "our Thing" (perhaps we could say cosa nostra), as 
something accessible only to us, as something "they," the others, cannot 
grasp; nonetheless it is something constantly menaced by "them." It 
appears as what gives plenitude and vivacity to our life, and yet the only 
way we can determine it is by resorting to different versions of the same 
empty tautology. All we can ultimately say about it is that the Thing is 
"itself," "the real Thing," "what it really is about," etc. If we are asked how 
we can recognize the presence of this Thing, the only consistent answer 
is that the Thing is present in that elusive entity called "our way of life." 
	  
One can see the relevance of such an idea in trying to better understand the 
character of the above-mentioned existential threat to democracy. ‘We’ know ‘we’ 
live in a democracy because we can ‘enumerate disconnected fragments’ of the way 
our democratic lives work: we are citizens, we are protected by human and political 
rights, one of these being the right to vote, we can participate in the electoral 
process freely, we have a free press and freedom of speech etc (Rancière 2005). And 
yet we feel we are at the mercy of ‘Others’ abusing and jeopardising our way of life, 
stealing our enjoyment. 
But who, precisely, are these ‘Others’ who abuse and jeopardize our 
democratic way of life?5 In relation to the populist hype hypothesis, one prominent 
figure to whom responsibility for this existential threat has been attributed can be 
identified: the irrational (populist) voter.6 One prominent example to illustrate this type 
of unacceptable, and even dangerous, behaviour was the reaction to the French 
presidential election in 2002, when Jean-Marie Le Pen reached the second round. 
Front pages of national newspapers (see images 2) unanimously condemned the vote 
after the first round, and expressed exaggerated relief after the second, ignoring at 
the same time the poor performance of the mainstream parties and the rise in 
abstention (Mondon 2015). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 It is worth noting that the logic of ‘theft of enjoyment’ is often – and most obviously perhaps – 
applied to explain the stance of rightwing parties, their representatives, and some of their supporters. 
Here, however, we are engaged in the rather unusual exercise of invoking this logic to elucidate the 
reaction of the normally tolerant elite-liberal politicians and commentariat. 
6 Irrational (populist) voters have at times been termed ‘reluctant radicals’ (Fieschi, C., Morris, M. and 
Caballero, L. (2012) Recapturing the Reluctant Radical: How to win back Europe's populist vote. London: 
Counterpoint.) 
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Images 2. Front pages of major French newspapers on 23 April 2002 – 
the use of words such as ‘earthquake’, ‘bomb’, ‘shock’, ‘danger’ and 
simply but forcefully ‘No’ being particularly noteworthy here. After the 
second round, Libération titled its front page ‘Ouf’ (Phew). 
 
In voting for racist/xenophobic/protectionist/interventionist options, the 
populist right voter renders obvious the paradoxical character of liberal democracy 
as the democratic/anti-democratic choice re-appears within democracy itself: you 
can vote for whoever you want, but you really shouldn’t. In this case, ‘Others’ (those 
voting for the populist right) irrationally and dangerously enjoy their democratic 
freedom inasmuch as they vote for seemingly radical options that seem to threaten 
the existence of democracy itself. This in turn threatens the narrative of the ‘end of 
history’ where political battles would be waged in the liberal centre and democratic 
choice would be limited to options with comfortable and negligible differences 
(Fukuyama 1992). The legitimacy of this system was strengthened by the existence of 
left and right options on the extremes of the political spectrum – options rendered 
obsolete on account of the stigma attached to crimes committed by their ideological 
forebears. Yet as the system falters, the appeal of these more radical options can 
grow again. A common storyline holds that this leads to the rise of an unruly mob 
(often referred to as ‘working-class’) keen to exercise these more radical options.7 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 In fact, as we noted in our earlier discussions of different vote-based measures of party popularity, 
most registered voters turn to abstention thus boosting the share of the vote of small parties, and the 
right-wing populists in particular. Abstention in the 2014 European elections was at an all-time high 
(42.54% participation against 43.00% in 2009). Participation in France and the UK was lower than the 
EU average with 42.43% and 35.40% respectively (TNS Opinion (2014a) 2014 post-election survey: 
European elections 2014, analytical overview, Brussels: European Parliament). Across the EU, the lowest 
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By enjoying their freedom to vote for something ‘radical’, these ‘irrational’ and 
‘irresponsible’ voters are impacting on the enjoyment of ‘our’ democracy. When 
irrational citizens risk moving away from the ‘proper’ parameters of our liberal 
democracy, this produces a moral outrage directly linked to a perceived threat to 
our democratic ideals (that is, those of the elite and self-titled middle classes). 
 
Problematizing ‘really existing’ liberal democracy 
The storyline figure of the irrational voter energizes narratives about threats to 
European liberal democracies. They help secure the ‘grip’ of a broader apocalyptic 
narrative in part because it manages to provoke feelings associated with a theft of 
enjoyment. But this is not the only thing these storylines have in common. 
Importantly, the preponderant focus on this figure as a threat to democracy has 
meant – somewhat paradoxically perhaps – that the idea of democracy presupposed 
in such a threat has not been sufficiently thematised. In particular, the operation of 
‘really existing liberal democracy’ has been left largely unexamined and 
unproblematized. 
This identification of ‘really existing liberal democracy’ as an issue worth 
thematising in a more sustained and systematic way brings us a step closer to 
grasping the political significance of the populist hype we have sketched out thus far. 
One prominent way the problem of ‘really existing liberal democracy’ has been 
expressed in academic literature is in terms of a decline of trust in our political 
institutions. Numerous polls have suggested that a majority of Europeans no longer 
trust their political institutions, whether parliamentary representatives, government 
or political parties. Results from the 2014 Eurobarometer showed that ‘[a] 'lack of 
trust in politics in general' was the main reason given for not voting among all 
categories except the youngest respondents and homemakers’ (TNS Opinion 
2014a). Since 2004, there has been only one instance out of twenty where trust in 
either parliament or government reached an approval of more than 40 per cent 
across Europe (European Commission 2015). Interestingly, it was in the September 
2007 wave, before the Global Financial Crisis hit Europe, that politicians and 
governments appeared the most trusted, or least distrusted. Since September 2009, 
the level of trust has fallen below 33 per cent and as low as 24 per cent in the 
Autumn 2013 survey (see figure 3). Trust in political parties has been even lower 
with only one instance in which levels reached more than 20 per cent (22 per cent in 
April 2006). In France, up to 90 per cent of respondents declared their lack of trust 
in the November 2014 survey (80 per cent in the UK in the same survey) (see figure 
4).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
participation in terms of occupation was to be found among manual workers (35%) and the 
unemployed (31%). In France, 34% of manual workers voted, while 3 out of 4 abstained in the UK, 
indicating a 25% participation rate (TNS Opinion (2014b) 2014 post-election survey: European elections 
2014, socio-demographic annex, Brussels: European Parliament). While many so-called working class 
voters may have voted for the populist right, the vast majority of the working class did not choose 
these parties or any others, something that has been overlooked in most mainstream coverage. 
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Figure 3: level of distrust in ‘government’ (question: ‘I would like to ask you a 
question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the 
following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?’ 
Answer: ‘Do not trust’). For each year when more than one poll was taken, the 
average is represented. (source: Eurobarometer) 
 
 
Figure 4: level of distrust in ‘political parties’ (source: Eurobarometer) 
There is a vast literature that points to widespread political discontent in 
existing liberal democratic societies. Although the more mainstream part of this 
literature often focusses on the lack of trust in our political institutions, there is also 
a common recognition that this lack of trust is symptomatic of a deeper problem 
linked to the idea that, increasingly, people’s experience tells them not only that they 
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are getting a bad (‘utility’) deal, but, more importantly, that they do not have much 
control over decisions that affect their lives (Agamben et al. 2011, Crouch 2004, 
Dean 2009, Rancière 1995, Rancière 2005). This suggests we need to be more 
precise about which norms are at stake when we consider the question of trust vis-
à-vis our liberal democratic institutions. In other words, it is not sufficient to point 
to attitudinal trends. We also need to identify what and how specific norms govern 
our liberal democratic practices, since these tend to influence our predisposition to 
trust (or not to trust) associated institutions and officials. 
This enables us to critically re-cast the political and ideological significance of 
the phenomenon we have characterized as ‘populist hype’. Populist hype can 
certainly be understood as perpetuating a kind of false-consciousness. This is because 
it exaggerates the rise of the populist right and falsely promotes its role as the main 
alternative to ‘business as usual’. However, it is also important to highlight how 
populist hype has a certain ‘logic’ to it. This logic has two components. One 
(ideological) component is related to the idea of enjoyment and the logics of fantasy 
and desire that make this possible. This has already been mentioned in connection 
with the apocalyptic dimension of populist hype narratives, and it is something we 
shall return to again later. Another (political) component is related to the precise 
norms of our democratic practice that we consider worth contesting or protecting. 
From this point of view, populist hype can be understood not simply as a propagator 
of falsehoods but also as embodying a political logic whose effect is to pre-empt the 
contestation of democratic norms we consider worth contesting; or to contest 
democratic norms we consider worth protecting. In other words, it is possible to 
argue that the problem has less to do with a threat to democracy as such and more 
to do with how a particular conception of democracy has become naturalized. In 
fact, we argue that the insistent focus on threats to democracy has served to avoid a 
more systematic and critical examination of, and wider debate about, the democratic 
system itself, including a more in-depth analysis of the current disillusion within the 
electorate. 
 
Populist Hype as a political logic 
So far, we have argued that the dominant response to the 2014 populist conjuncture 
has been ‘hyped’. The story is much more complex and nuanced than the image of a 
right-wing populist surge would have us believe. Yet we also suggested that although 
it is important to get this nuanced picture right as part of a general process of 
characterisation, it is also important not to lose sight of the ‘logic’ of such populist 
hype. Thus, this part of the article seeks to draw out its political logic in more detail 
in order to get a better fix on how to critically evaluate the role and function of 
populist hype. 
Political logic is a term used by poststructuralist political theorists Ernesto 
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (Laclau and Mouffe 1985) in order to emphasize its 
difference from what they call social logics. With the term social logics, they aim to 
capture the relatively stable patterns, rules, or norms manifest in practices or 
regimes of practice, for example, the norms of ‘really existing’ liberal democracy. 
Typically, these are understood as ‘natural’, in the sense that they are taken for 
granted, internalized, and uncontested. The operation of political logics, on the other 
hand, often becomes clear in times of crisis when ‘things are not quite right’, 
revealing, even for a brief moment, how what appears to be natural can be 
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otherwise. This ‘visibility of contingency’ is central to understanding the role and 
function of political logics. Political logics are thus understood to be processes that 
seek to maintain or disrupt settled norms. 
The concept of logics has been further elaborated and systematically 
developed into a ‘logics approach’ to the study of social and political phenomena 
(Glynos and Howarth 2007). Drawing on psychoanalytic insights to supplement key 
poststructuralist premises, this approach identifies and names a third logic that draws 
on the concept of fantasy to elucidate ideological processes (Glynos 2001, Glynos 
and Stavrakakis 2004, Stavrakakis 1999). This fantasmatic logic captures something 
about the desire of subjects, independent of whether such desires are considered 
(un)realistic. Logics of fantasy thus help account for why and how narratives ‘grip’ 
subjects by rendering contingency less visible. The nexus of social, political, and 
fantasmatic logics is thus deployed to analyse and interpret the discursively 
constructed character of practices, including the way the status quo is protected, 
challenged, and defended (Glynos et al. 2012). 
In light of this theoretical framework, the political logic of populist hype can 
be discerned by first getting a fix on the character of the status quo. In other words, a 
political logic can be identified only in relation to particular norms that are (or should 
be) the subject of protection, challenge or defence. In our case, this leads to the 
rather obvious question about which norms in our ‘really existing’ liberal democratic 
regime should be identified as worth contesting or defending. In answer to this 
question two such norms are considered and elaborated in more detail below: the 
norm of electoral primacy, and the norm of presumptive equality. It is argued that 
populist hype functions as a political logic if it can plausibly be claimed that it is 
operative in relation to key norms which are thought to be worth contesting (the 
norm of electoral primacy) or are worth defending and reinforcing (the norm of 
presumptive equality). Our hypothesis, therefore, is that populist hype serves as a 
‘master’ political logic that gathers together a clutch of more specific political and 
rhetorical logics that (1) pre-empt the contestation of, and reinforce, the norm of 
electoral primacy; and (2) undermine or contest the norm of presumptive equality. 
We discuss each of these in turn. 
Electoral primacy 
Electoral primacy is perhaps the most obvious norm in relation to which populist hype 
can be characterised as a political logic. This is a norm of ‘really existing’ liberal 
democracy that has been identified by numerous scholars and many commentators 
at the margins of mainstream media as worthy of contestation (Agamben et al. 2011, 
Rancière 2005). They argue that an understanding of democracy as predominantly an 
electoral democracy needs to be contested and pluralized. In this view, apart from 
widespread popular and schoolbook renditions of democracy as predominantly an 
electoral democracy, a well-financed psephological apparatus is mobilised on a daily 
basis by a massive expert techno-media-academic network to promote and reinforce 
this understanding and operation of democracy, crowding out other more 
meaningful (deliberative, local and economically-relevant, etc.) ways of thinking about 
and practicing democracy (Cayrol 2007, Lepore 2015). From this perspective the 
norm of electoral primacy is not necessary and indeed could (and should) be 
otherwise. 
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Therefore, populist hype here serves as a ‘master’ political logic that, in 
feeding off the above-mentioned mediatic, educational and psephological apparatuses, 
gathers together a set of more targeted political and rhetorical logics that pre-empt 
the contestation of, and reinforce, the norm of electoral primacy. For example, as 
previously discussed, by focusing attention on how ‘irrational’ some voters are in 
their electoral choices there is a risk that we both individualise the problem (i.e. it is 
not a problem of the system but of the individual voter) and reinforce an electoral 
conceptualization of democracy since the problem lies with individual voters.  
Presumptive equality 
The liberal democratic norm of presumptive equality is another norm in relation to 
which populist hype can be characterised as a political logic. It expresses how the 
principle of equality is understood to operate in a presumptive fashion, in the sense 
that equality of regard and treatment among people serves as the default assumption 
governing the relationship between citizens. The idea of a presumptive equality 
implies of course that it can be rebutted for good reasons in particular 
circumstances. Crucially, however, it also implies that conditions need to be in place 
in order to avoid differential, arbitrary, or discriminatory treatment. As was the case 
with the norm of electoral primacy, the norm of presumptive equality is not a 
necessary norm. We saw earlier how populist hype has a political logic in relation to 
the norm of electoral primacy because it promotes and reinforces it. In this case, 
however, the political logic of populist hype functions in a way which undermines or 
contests the norm of presumptive equality. This norm thus could (and should) need 
defending when undermined. 
In making this claim we rely on a well-established literature that points out 
how savvy ‘normalisation’ strategies adopted by right-wing parties do not prevent us 
from characterising their rhetoric and tactics as ‘neo-racist’ (Balibar 1997, Barker 
1982). In both our cases, UKIP and the FN pledged explicit allegiance to liberal 
democratic rules. However, while these parties have denounced forms of traditional 
racism within their ranks (Sulzer2015, Saul 2015), albeit unevenly and inconsistently, 
they have sharpened strategies to render certain forms of exclusion and 
scapegoating more palatable for, or ‘inaudible’ to, a mainstream audience, by 
targeting fantasised versions of Islam in particular (Mondon and Winter 2015, Yilmaz 
2011). Treating populist hype as a political logic, however, allows us to contribute to 
this literature by suggesting that the normalisation of these parties involves a dual 
process that springs not only from these parties’ own strategies, but also from the 
way ‘second order’ political analysis and commentary of this populist phenomenon is 
skewed and disseminated (i.e., ‘hyped’). In other words, insofar as the norm of 
presumptive equality is undermined in the ‘first order’ discourses of UKIP and FN 
themselves, we suggest that this undermining is also a feature of ‘second order’ 
populist hype, despite its explicit condemnation of right-wing populism, in part 
because it disseminates this first order discourse more widely and even serves to 
legitimize its views as belonging to a voting, and thus democratic, polity (Mondon 
2015). 
For Annie Collovald (2004), applying the term ‘populism’ to these parties has 
itself played a key rhetorical role in legitimising right-wing demands and 
‘mainstreaming’ prejudice: replacing traditional terms such as ‘extreme right’, ‘far 
right’ or ‘radical right’ by ‘populism’ has been problematic as it is not only ‘blurrier, 
but also less stigmatizing than the ones it is meant to replace’. As this terminology 
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has taken root in the public discourse, right-wing populist parties have eclipsed the 
potential and/or importance of other ‘popular’ alternatives, including more left-wing 
populist alternatives. After borrowing the rhetoric and even some policies from so-
called ‘populist’ right-wing parties, mainstream politicians have claimed they have 
merely been listening to the ‘people’ and their fears (Mondon 2013). Following a 
similarly circular logic, the media has been able to explain its focus on immigration 
(and benefit fraud to a certain extent) by the rise of intolerance within the 
electorate. Our hypothesis therefore is that right-wing populist hype serves as a 
‘master’ political logic that gathers together a set of more specific political and 
rhetorical logics that undermine or contest the norm of presumptive equality. 
Although debates about the character of liberal democracy of the sort we advocate 
no doubt do take place, we argue that the political logic of populist hype tends to 
narrow the scope of such debate by pushing these discussions to the margins of 
mainstream political discourse, usually finding a place in ‘radical’ media outlets or 
‘minor’ academic fora. 
 
The fantasmatic logic of Populist Hype 
The bulk of this article has been devoted to the identification and critical evaluation 
of populist hype, conceived as a political logic, particularly in relation to the norms of 
electoral primacy and presumptive equality. This final section explores the 
fantasmatic dimension of populist hype narratives. This is a key part of the argument 
as the fantasmatic elements of populist hype narratives serve to ‘prime’ readers in 
one or another normative direction, in the sense that these fantasmatic elements 
(and the enjoyment that they make possible) offer ideological support for one or 
another policy response to perceived problems. This is why it is usually not 
particularly effective to counter the political logic of right-wing populist hype (as well 
as nativist right-wing narratives) by appealing only to ‘facts’. In other words, facts are 
not only always-already discursively framed; more than that, they are also often 
fantasmatically-inflected. In this view, what makes these narratives ‘grip’ is the 
enjoyment they make possible, and this enjoyment, in turn, is intimately connected 
to the subject, conceived as a subject of lack, and thus a subject of desire. As Žižek 
(Žižek 1993: pp.203-204) observes, ‘what we conceal by imputing to the Other the 
theft of enjoyment is the traumatic fact that we never possessed what was allegedly 
stolen from us’. Such fantasmatic narratives thereby ‘energize’ political logics, giving 
them their force and appeal. 
We have already drawn attention to the powerful idea of ‘theft of enjoyment’ 
in accounting for the affective power animating the anger and resentment 
experienced by those horrified by the perceived rise of right-wing populism and the 
threat this poses to democracy. However, the threat is not so much a threat to 
democracy as such, as it is to a particular conception of democracy whose privileged 
definitional criterion is electoral contestation. A political logic of populist hype 
energized by ‘theft of enjoyment’ thus succeeds in reinforcing a rather narrow 
conception of democracy that deserves to be contested and pluralized. This is so for 
several reasons. First, populist hype narratives suggest that democracy should be 
understood as a predominantly electoral or parliamentary democracy, thereby 
marginalizing other more deliberative and participatory criteria. Second, populist 
hype narratives tend to mainstream prejudice in a way that promotes the 
presumptive exclusion of certain types of people from being equal citizens of our 
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demos. We could add a third reason here, namely, that populist hype narratives 
suggest that democracy should be understood as a predominantly political 
democracy, thereby ignoring life experienced outside political institutions. Given 
how the vast majority of our adult lives are spent in the workplace, of particular 
note here is the rather systematic exclusion of democratic principles from our 
economic life generally, and the (neoliberal) production process specifically. 
Together this deeply troubling triple marginalization can be said to account for a 
profound and widespread sense of alienation whose source is captured by the term 
‘capitalo-parliamentarism’ (Badiou 2007). 
In some sense, then, the seduction and pull of ‘theft of enjoyment’ tends to 
deflect attention away from the rather undemocratic character of ‘really existing’ 
liberal democracy and political economy. But a question remains. Where, more 
precisely, does fantasy enter the picture here? By fantasy we simply mean to draw 
attention to those elements of a narrative that provoke enjoyment and desire. For 
example: what fantasies make possible the affective experiences associated with 
‘theft of enjoyment’? At a relatively abstract level, these fantasies could be called 
‘capitalo-parliamentary’ fantasies. In this case, ‘capitalo-parliamentary’ fantasies 
sustain a regime of capitalo-parliamentarism. Yet in order to better appreciate the 
‘tug’ of a fantasmatic narrative, it is essential to specify more precisely the (lost or 
threatened) ideals at stake, the obstacles to those ideals, as well as the character and 
paradoxes of enjoyment as subjects negotiate and transgress those ideals. 
Importantly, it is necessary to be attentive to the specific national and historical self-
images projected in the effort to heighten the urgency of an existential threat or 
enhance a beatific future to come. Therefore, such fantasmatic patterns will most 
certainly vary as a function of media outlet (e.g., conservative, liberal or progressive) 
and national context and history (UK or French in the present case); something 
which is beyond the remit of this article. 
 
Conclusion 
The importance of our contribution resides in making explicit how populist hype has 
a ‘logic’ to it that is not reducible to irrationality or misrecognition. The article also 
shows that this ‘logic’ has political and ideological significance. Its political significance 
is demonstrated by identifying what norms are at stake in such right-wing populist 
hype, and the mode of relating to them (to pre-empt, reinforce, contest, undermine, 
or restore certain norms). Its ideological significance is highlighted by pointing to the 
fantasmatic narratives that underlie and animate the populist hype. 
The analysis pointed to a potentially powerful source of discontent residing in 
people’s experience, which tells them that they have little control over decisions that 
affect their lives. This is a source of discontent that is widely noted to afflict ‘really 
existing liberal democracies’. An appeal to the category of political logic can serve to 
bring this discontent into sharper focus in order to tackle it directly, or it can serve 
to transpose or articulate discontent differently. The article identifies right-wing 
populist hype as one such potent ‘master’ political logic which partakes in a kind of 
double-action movement targeting right-wing populist parties: by construing right-
wing populism as a threat to our existing democracies, it pre-empts the contestation 
of an important norm that is worth contesting: the norm of electoral primacy; by 
giving extensive exposure to right wing claims and agendas that are explicitly 
opposed to an out of touch elite political class, it inadvertently undermines the norm 
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of presumptive equality and installs, restores, and reinforces a set of ethnic, racial, 
and economic inequality norms.8 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Insofar as the focus becomes the populism of right-wing parties, it also risks rendering equivalent left 
and right-wing populism, who often have very different views regarding the norm of presumptive 
equality (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014). 
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POPULISMUS: POPULIST DISCOURSE AND DEMOCRACY 
Populism is dynamically and unexpectedly back on the agenda. Latin American 
governments dismissing the so-called "Washington consensus" and extreme right-
wing parties and movements in Europe advancing xenophobic and racist 
stereotypes have exemplified this trend. Emerging social movements and parties in 
Southern Europe that resisted the current administration of the global financial 
crisis as well as the Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders presidential candidacies in 
the US have also been branded "populist". The POPULISMUS research project 
involved a comparative mapping of the populist discourse articulated by such 
sources in order to facilitate a reassessment of the category of "populism" and to 
develop a theoretical approach capable of reorienting the empirical analysis of 
populist ideologies in the global environment of the 21st century. Building on the 
theoretical basis offered by the discourse theory developed by the so-called "Essex 
School", POPULISMUS endorses a discursive methodological framework in order 
to explore the multiple expressions of populist politics, to highlight the need to 
study the emerging cleavage between populism and anti-populism and to assess the 
effects this has on the quality of democracy. Through the dissemination of its 
research findings we anticipate that the synthetic analysis of populist discourse it 
puts forward and the emerging evaluation of populism’s complex and often 
ambivalent relationship with democracy will advance the relevant scientific 
knowledge, also enabling the deepening of democratic culture in times of crisis. 
